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Turkey’s future in the European Union (EU) is a subject of intense debate both in Europe and in
Turkey today. Although Turkey first applied to join the EU 45 years ago, it is the only candidate
country, which has not yet started accession negotiations. On the one hand, any future enlargement
that includes Turkey is a controversial topic for the EU, since Turkey would be the only Muslim
member in the EU, which has accepted 10 new members in May 2004. On the other hand, it is too
late to exclude Turkey from the future of the EU since it has put the issue of the EU accession at the
top of its national agenda and is the only candidate country that has completed the Customs Union
with the EU. This article aims to explore future scenarios regarding Turkey’s inclusion to or
exclusion from the EU and assess their short and long term implications.
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1. Why does the future of Turkey in the EU matter?
The future of Turkey in the EU has become an important question that deeply concerns
both the EU and Turkish sides, and the Turkish case seems to remain as the most
problematic enlargement that the EU will have to handle in the near future. The
importance of the Turkish case in the enlargement scheme of the EU stems from five main
factors: first, despite the ‘principle of inclusiveness’ [28] which is a finding idea of the EU,
Turkey is the only remaining candidate country which, despite having signed an
Association Agreement with the EU 40 years ago in 1964, has not yet even started
accession negotiations. The enlargement to include Turkey has been quite controversial
within the EU itself since there are differences of opinion among the member states, both
supporting and rejecting the idea of Turkey joining in the union. Turkey’s longstandingFutures 37 (2005) 303–316www.elsevier.com/locate/futures0016-3287/$ - see front matter q 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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reflected in the following statement of the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Gunther
Verheugen: “This decision to accept Turkey was made long ago. For decades, Turkey has
been told that it has prospects of becoming a full member. It would have disastrous
consequences if we now tell Turkey: actually we did not mean this at all” [13].
Second, a future enlargement to include Turkey would be a unique experience for the
EU since Turkey will be the only Muslim country. This factor is all the more problematic
because of Turkey’s large population of 70 million who would join a union that is often
referred to as a ‘Christian Club’. This has created a ‘Turco-phobia’ among some of the
Europeans, as was revealed in the statements of the Head of the Convention on Europe,
Valerie Giscard D’Estaing, on the eve of the decision regarding the date for start of
accession negotiations with Turkey. He stated that Turkey does not have a place in the EU
since ‘it has a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life’. For these
reasons, he claimed that admitting Turkey would be the end of the European Union [7].
Third, the topic is also very important since the 2004 enlargement of the EU on 1 May
2004 will most likely pose additional challenges to the future of EU–Turkey relations.
These challenges will primarily concern the ‘problem of digestion’ of the 10 candidates
and two prospective-candidate countries in the near future and may cause attention to be
diverted more to ‘deepening’ than ‘widening’ issues. It has become obvious since the Nice
Summit in 2000 that the EU has been striving to find ways to tackle the problems that
could emanate from this enlargement—it is most expensive yet. It is under these new
circumstances, i.e. an EU with 25 members, that the Turkish case will be handled in the
near future. In addition, it is obvious that the Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEECs) will compete with the Mediterranean states, including Turkey—in case it
becomes a member in the future—for scant development resources [8], most of which are
the structural funds.
Fourth, quite apart from all the above mentioned factors, the future of Turkey in the EU
is deemed just as important in its relation to the EU’s security environment. Turkey,
bordering on the most volatile region of the Middle East and the political regimes of Iran,
Iraq and Syria, seems to be an important bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism and the
challenges to European security that could stem from political instability in the Middle
East and the Mediterranean. Yet, although it also acts as a bridge to secure the interests of
the European countries in the region, Turkey is the only NATO and Western European
Union (WEU) member, which is not a full member of the EU.
Finally, from the perspective of Turkey, the future in the EU is also very important
since it is regarded as an aspiration that will change the whole face of Turkey. It has always
been seen as a very important component of westernization as well as modernization
praised by Mustafa Kemal Atatu¨rk, the founder of the Turkish Republic in the early 1920s.
Therefore, most of the Turkish population regards its candidacy as a matter of ‘national
pride’ and places the utmost importance on becoming a full member. Even the recent
general elections in Turkey in which and the religiously-oriented Justice and Development
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) came to power in a victory that gave them a clear
parlimentary majority, did not mark a change in Turkey’s policy towards the EU. The
official position that expects the EU to give a date for the start of the accession negotiations
for the EU in Copenhagen was stronger than ever.
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The recognition of Turkey as a candidate for accession at the Helsinki European
Council in December 1999 opened a new page in relations between Turkey and the EU. As
foreseen in the Helsinki European Council conclusions, the EU Commission started to
prepare an Accession Partnership for Turkey, which was adopted on 8 March 2001. After
the approval of the Accession Partnership by the EU, the Turkish Government announced
its own ‘National Program for the Adoption of the EU Acquis’ on 19 March 2001 and
submitted it to the European Commission the same month. The National Program has been
produced with a careful assessment of the short and medium term priorities as spelled out
in the Accession Partnership. Within the past 3 years, Turkey has taken a number of
important steps towards this end.
The most important among these was the major review of the 1982 constitution. Thirty-
four articles of the Turkish Constitution were amended in 2001 in accordance with the
provisions of the National Program. Seven reform packages have passed through the
parliament. The packages of constitutional amendments have covered a wide range of
issues, such as improving human rights, strengthening the rule of law, restructuring
democratic institutions, increasing freedom of association and the right to assembly, as
well as gender equality and child protection and adoption of a new civil code. In addition,
the reform packages have amended various laws regarding the legal basis for the detention
and sentencing of many intellectuals for expressing their views, extended further the scope
of freedom of thought and expression and freedom of the press. They have reinforced
measures for the prevention of torture and ill-treatment, and introduced stronger deterrents
against human rights violations by public personnel.
The most remarkable of these reforms were those abolishing the death penalty, lifting
legal restrictions on individual cultural rights, making retrial possible in the light of the
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, ensuring the right to property of
community foundations belonging to official minorities in Turkey, providing the legal
basis needed for the activities of foreign foundations in Turkey, introducing new
definitions and measures to deal with illegal immigration. Together, these mark a radical
break with the long history of statism.
The new government, which was formed after the general elections of 3 November
2002, prepared two further legislative packages. The first legislative package, the so-
called ‘Copenhagen Package’, was submitted to Parliament on 3 December 2002. It
was drafted with due regard to the evaluation made in the EU’s 2002 Regular Report
on Turkey. The purpose of this package was to reinforce the reform process and
eliminate certain ambiguities, especially with respect to implementation. With the
adoption of this package, all legal impediments to the prosecution of public officials
accused of resorting to torture and ill-treatment will be removed. By this, the Turkish
government has declared ‘zero tolerance’ against torture and ill-treatment and alerted
all public officials accordingly [39]. As part of the reform packages, the role of the
National Security Council (NSC), which is generally seen as reflecting the ‘political
role’ of the Turkish military, was also amended. The new provisions aim to limit the
role of the NSC in Turkish politics, primarily by increasing the number of civilians in
the council.
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Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council held on 11–12 December
2002 stated thatIt strongly welcomes the important steps taken by Turkey towards meeting the
Copenhagen criteria, in particular through the recent legislative packages and the
subsequent implementation measures, which cover a large number of key priorities
specified in the Accession Partnership. The Union acknowledges the determination
of the new Turkish government to take further steps on the path of reform and urges
in particular the government to address swiftly all remaining shortcomings in the
field of the political criteria, not only with regard to legislation but also in particular
with regard to implementation. The Union recalls that, according to the political
criteria decided in Copenhagen in 1993, membership requires that a candidate
country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities [24].The Presidency Conclusions additionally stated that the Union encourages Turkey to
pursue energetically its reform process. If the European Council in December 2004, on the
basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils
the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with
Turkey without delay.in order to assist Turkey towards EU membership, the accession
strategy for Turkey shall be strengthened. The Commission is invited to submit a proposal
for a revised Accession Partnership and to intensify the process of legislative scrutiny.
In parallel, the EC–Turkey Customs Union should be extended and deepened. The Union
will significantly increase its pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey. This assistance
will from 2004 be financed under the budget heading ‘pre-accession expenditure’ [24].
As the conclusions indicate, the future of Turkey in the EU will depend to a great extent
on the decision at end of this year, which therefore carries utmost importance for both sides
since the EU is expected to give a date for the start of the accession negotiations with Turkey.
Section 3 will explore some short-term and long-term future scenerios in this regard.3. Future scenerios
3.1. Scenerio I: ‘yes’ to Turkey
This scenerio assumes that the EU will give a date to Turkey for the start of accession
negotiations in 2005. The decision will be taken primarily because of the positive steps
taken by Turkey to meet the criticisms of the EU. The EU will express its satisfaction both
regarding the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria and Turkey’s foreign policy towards
the Cyprus problem. Regarding the Copenhagen Criteria, Turkey will pass more
legislation revising the status of the Turkish military in Turkish politics and regarding the
amelioration of the human rights records. It will also take important steps to liberalize its
economy further, take measures against corruption, etc.
The Cyprus problem, which used to act as an obstacle in the future development of
relations between the EU and Turkey, will no longer do so. This will be primarily due to
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Annan Plan by voting ‘yes’ in the referendum held on 24 April 2004. The Turkish attitude
vis-a`-vis the Cyprus problem will continue to increase its credibility in the eyes of the EU
member states which will eventually think that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are really
longing for a solution towards the settlement of the Cyprus problem.
3.2. Scenerio II: a conditional ‘yes’ to Turkey
This scenerio also assumes that the EU will make a positive decision about Turkey’s
membership by giving a date for the start of the accession negotiations in 2005 yet due
only to purely political and strategic reasons. Turkey’s membership of the EU will take
place only when the international situation allows for it. In other words, fulfillment of the
Copenhagen Criteria will not provide a sufficient motivation for the EU countries to allow
Turkey to become a member. Rather, the main motivations are concern over oil and
competition for transatlantic markets.
3.2.1. The concern over oil
The recent war in Iraq will probably encourage the EU to develop mechanisms to act in
greater harmony, while also avoiding being excluded from the power structures that would
control oil supplies in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. There are two
important reasons why the EU may be interested in full membership for Turkey: first the
Baku¨-Ceyhan oil pipeline that will bring Caspian Sea oil to the Mediterranean through the
territory of Turkey; second, the difficult post-war situation in Iraq and the increasing
American control of the Iraqi oil supplies. Turkey, as a neighbor to Iraq and as a host to a
pipeline that brings Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean, will have great geostrategic importance
for the EU because in the foreseeable future, the only access to the Mediterranean for both
pipelines seems to be through Turkish territory.
3.2.2. The transatlantic competition for markets
The other reason why the EU may be more interested in accepting Turkey as a full
member has to do with the increasing American power in the Middle East and the
Mediterranean. As the United States will have a foot in the Middle East from establishing a
firmer presence on Iraqi territory, the EU will have to increase its power in order to cope
with American power in these regions and cannot do it without securing Turkey to its side.
A Euro-Mediterranean partnership which currently envisages the creation of a free trade
zone across both the north and south Mediterranean by the year 2010 will probably
accelerate to balance the increasing presence of the United States in the same region. The
EU, after possibly admitting Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, may consider opening
accession negotiations with Turkey.
3.3. Scenerio 3: ‘no’ to Turkey
In spite of all the variety of arguments that support Turkey’s membership of the EU, the
likelihood of another scenerio is worth considering. This is the scenerio in which in the
near future the EU does not even give a date for the start of the accession negotiations
A. Gu¨ney / Futures 37 (2005) 303–316308and tries to keep Turkey on the sidelines by emphasizing the ‘insurmountable’ differences
between the two sides that have been expressed from time to time by important European
leaders. The factors which may act as future obstacles to Turkey’s membership of the EU
can be considered under four main headings.
3.3.1. Post-2004 enlargement challenges
One of the major factors which has influenced to a great extent the future of Turkey’s
relations with the EU is the enlargement of the EU by including 10 new countries (Poland,
Hungary, the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta and Cyprus) on 1 May 2004. The prospective date for the ‘acceding countries’,
namely Bulgaria and Rumania seems to be 2007. Turkey is the only country among the
previous 13 candidates, which, despite having applied to the Union the earliest, has been
granted neither membership status nor an exact negotation date.
One of the main implications of the 2004 enlargement for Turkey is that Turkey’s
EU candidacy should be evaluated within the larger framework of enlargement, and
that Turkish membership will not be determined solely by the country’s ability to meet
the accession criteria, but also by EU-specific factors that impact on the Union’s
approach to Turkey [14]. The European Commission officials are still discussing the
logistics of how an EU of 25 member states can function efficiently and effectively in
the post-2004 enlargement period. The power relations between the EU member
countries are also important in assessing the impact of the 2004 enlargement upon
Turkey. For example, German foreign minister Joschka Fisher has expressed his vision
of a federalized Europe in which he advocated the idea of a ‘core’ suggesting that a
group of more advanced countries should take the position of, ‘center of gravity’ [5].
The EU with 25 member states has become a giant that nobody really knows how it
will function. Yet, it is for sure that the decision for the start of the negotiations with
Turkey will necessitate the votes of all the newcomers as well, who will, most probably
not prefer Turkey to get a share in the structural funds. These 10 new countries have
brought with them unique histories, cultures, attitudes to development and political
priorities. They have full voting rights alongside the current 15 members. The
functioning of the previous decision-making mechanisms with the inclusion of the 10
new member states seems to remain core concerns of the EU officials as well as
statesmen, and these concerns will definitely shape significantly Turkey’s position and
how it will be perceived.
Historical evidence reveals that the EU has been from time to time bound by the
objections of one or few countries which has a national stake in blocking relations between
Turkey and the EU. The Greek veto over the Fourth Financial Protocol is a good example
in this respect. As Mu¨ftu¨ler-Bac¸ argues, the protection of national interests against
supranational authority has become a legitimate EU practice, especially after the so-called
Luxembourg Compromise in 1966 [15]. Unanimity voting therefore makes the
decisions of enlargement quite difficult. However, Turkey is not without allies in the
EU. The candidate country Eurobarometer results (2001) indicate that the states which
support the Turkish position the most are other Mediterranean countries, especially Spain
and Portugal, due to their concern that acceptance of Turkey into the Union will strengthen
the Southern cone of the EU as a lever against the Northern cone of Europe.
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the part of the EU member states. With a voting weight corresponding to its population of
nearly 70 million, Turkey will be the second most influential member in the decision-
making mechanisms of the EU institutions, especially in the European Parliament and the
European Council. Therefore, some the EU member states which consider Turkey as
belonging neither to ‘geographical Europe’ nor to ‘cultural Europe’ express their concern
from time to time that such a latecomer should not be able to play a major role in decision-
making that will affect the future of all the EU member states. The impact of this concern
was illustrated with the Nice European Council’s decision to omit Turkey from the
calculations of voting power in an enlarged Union [16].
3.3.2. ‘European’ versus ‘Turkish’ identity
One of the important aspects of Europe’s future vision seems to encompass the creation
of a European demos on the basis of common European values [30]. The enlargement
process is a means whereby the EU is shaping its eastern and southern periphery in
accordance with its own priorities. In this sense, the EU also defines being a European state
according to certain criteria [18]. Since the demise of the strategic division of Europe into
two blocs, the definition of borders of Europe has started to be questioned. Yet this inquiry
did not concern the CEEC countries much due to their historical bonds with Western
Europe. Eastward enlargement was not motivated just by political, economic and security
interests on both sides, but it also had a moral dimension in reuniting Europe and reviving
the pre-Yalta order [9]. In other words, the definition of Europe and ‘Europeanness’ has
been linked closely to geography, politics and culture and therefore creates concern for
some countries, such as Turkey [10]. The words uttered by the Head of the Convention
Valerie Giscard d’Estaing who said “Turkey must never be allowed into the European
Union.since it has a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life”, were
very much resented in Turkey. D’Estaing was unambiguous on the issue of the EU
membership and stated that ‘Turkey is a country that is close to Europe, an important
country.but it is not a European country..Its capital is not in Europe, 95% of its
population are outside [32].’ His words can be seen as a good indicator of how some
Europeans still perceive Turkey. Likewise, although Germany has officially backs
Turkey’s bid, the Christian Democrats, who play a very important role in German politics,
argue that Turkey’s admission could be ‘political suicide’, alleging that Turkey’s
membership would ‘overtax’ the EU’s capacity for integration and hinder economic
growth within the bloc [27].
On the other hand, recent Eurobarometers reveal the fact that 77% of the Turkish
population is not well-informed about the EU, its enlargement policies, or its internal
political mechanisms. Therefore, accession to the EU will seemingly remain as a project of
the Turkish elite that has not been well-presented to the Turkish public with its pros and
cons. This lack of information becomes quite important especially when relations with the
EU become a matter of domestic politics and are used as a tool of party politics rather than
a national policy in Turkey. Therefore the first important problem remains the
internalisation of the project of the EU membership by the masses in Turkey. This
problem can only be overcome with a large-scale communication strategy that embraces
all sectors of Turkish society, not the educated elite only.
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Turkey and misperceptions characterize European public opinion in most of the EU
member states. The perceptions of Europeans are mostly shaped either by factors
emanating from the internal political and social problems of the EU such as xenophobia
due to high unemployment and illegal immigration, or by factors that stem from sui
generis problems which would arise due to a possible future accession of Turkey to the
Union. Among these factors are the following: the historical psychological legacy that the
Ottoman Empire left behind, especially in countries that were once a part of the Empire;
the huge population of Turkey, and the Turkish youth that might flow to Europe in case of
a possible membership; the fact that Turkey is predominantly a Muslim country, and the
perception of Islam as a threat—especially after the September 11 incident in 2001. In
conclusion, the perceptions of the EU regarding Turkey are shaped both by its own current
problems as well as the problems that Turkey is considered to bring in its ‘backpack’ if it
were to become a member state.
3.3.3. The Cyprus Imbroglio
The Cyprus question has become closely linked to Turkey–EU relations and is even
regarded by some as Turkey’s key to the EU [21]. The application to the EU of the Greek
government in Cyprus in the name of the whole island as well has started to complicate
things regarding Turkey’s position vis-a`-vis the EU. Instead of making the solution of the
Cyprus problem a pre-requisite for Cypriot membership, the EU seemed to prefer a tactical
approach, thinking that the EU membership will act as a catalyst in the search for a
solution to the island’s division [4]. The declaration of Greek Cypriot President Tasos
Papadopoulos on 7 April 2004, on the other hand, revealed that he himself did not approve
of the Annan Plan and does not see this as the ultimate chance for a solution. What he
implied in his speech to the Greek Cypriot population was that after Cyprus becomes an
EU member, it would block any decision regarding Turkey’s EU membership, until a
solution is reached on better terms for the Greek Cypriots than the Annan Plan [12]. The
Annan Plan, which was voted by referendum on each part of the island, has had a
significant impact on Turkey’s bid for opening accession negotiations with the EU. About
75% of the Greek Cypriots voted ‘no’ while 65% of the Turkish Cypriots voted yes.
Therefore, the Cyprus problem may continue to pose an important challenge to the
future of Turkey in the EU, particularly in view of the accession of the Greek part of the
island despite their rejection of the Annan Plan. There seems to be two important issues at
stake: the lifting of the embargo on the Turkish Cypriot part, and the recognition of the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The statements of the EU officials before the
referendum signalled that the EU is willing to change its attitude towards the Turkish
Cypriot part. For instance, Javier Solana, on the date of the referendum stated that “if at the
end of the day the southern part vote no and the other part yes, the relation with the other
part will have to be also different. They cannot be left forever in the cold” [34]. After the
referendum, Gunther Verheugen, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, stated that “he
felt ‘cheated’ by the Greek Cypriot leadership which has campaigned against the plan”
[34]. Nevertheless, the EU did not change its attitude towards the Greek Cypriot part
and they were admitted to the EU on 1 May 2004. This caused a serious resentment on the
part of the Turkish Cypriots. The resentment can best be seen in the words of
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outside the EU while the side which rejects the plan joins the EU with the claim of being
the representative of the other side. That is out of question.we abided by our
commitments. It is now the turn of the international community to prepare proposals.to
alleviate or remove the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots” [35]. The same sort of
resentment is also prevalent on the part of Turkey. According to Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an stated “From now on nothing should be the same, and the EU must
now initiate a process and act to conform with its pledges to ease the impact of an embargo
on northern Cyprus” [11]. Turkey is also pressing the EU to revise the terms of Cyprus’s
accession to the union, saying the results of the referendum have changed the bases of
existing conditions [36].
Another major issue on the agenda regarding the Cyprus problem if the issue of getting
international recognition in order to demonstrate that the Greek Cypriot rejection of the
Annan Plan could lead to a permanent partition on the island. Although Turkey expected
the support of the EU in this regard, Verheugen underlined that “the EU would get into
direct contact with the Turkish Cypriot officials but cooperation does not mean
recognition” [37].
Turkey also seems quite dissatistifed about the revisions that EU ambassadors agreed to
make to entry regulations since the revisions fall short of meeting a firm Turkish demand
for direct communication, transportation and trade links between the EU and Turkish
Cypriots. The revisions envisaged that all goods produced in northern Cyprus could cross
the ‘green line’, but they denied to propose any measure that would allow direct
international air and sea links from the EU states to northern Cyprus.
One other problem is concerning the role of the Turkish military in the Cyprus problem.
The military most recently voiced out its support for President Rauf Denktas who strongly
opposed the Annan Plan. On this matter, the AKP government and the military seem to
pursue different policies which may also affect the future course of Turkey’s policy
towards Cyprus as well as the EU.
In the light of all these recent developments, what the future holds for the Turkish
Cypriot part is quite uncertain. This uncertainty on the part of EU’s future Cyprus policy as
well as a growing future resentment on the part of Turkish Cypriots and Turkey may act as
important challenges to the future of Turkey’s relations with the EU. Therefore, the
Cyprus problem will continue to occupy an important place in determining the future
relations of Turkey with the EU. Therefore, the EU policy of acting as a catalyst in Cyprus
may have some negative consequences for Turkey’s bid for the EU membership, if
Turkey’s expectations are not fulfilled by the EU’s Cyprus policy in the near future. This is
because there has been and will continue to be an essential overlap between hardliners on
the Cyprus conflict and the most nationalist and euro-sceptic forces in Turkey, as those
who are sceptical of Turkey’s future in Europe seem to be persistent in their effective
opposition to the unification of Cyprus [33].
3.3.4. The EU’s dilemma of deepening versus widening
One of the most critical tasks that the EU has been dealing with is the future of Europe
itself and what kind of regime model it will adopt. The models vary from ‘A European
Confederation’ to ‘A European Kind of Switzerland’ or ‘Canadian-type European
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Amsterdam Treaty in 1998 due to fears inherent in rapid change within the nation-state
and the different effects of the EU policies on member states and their citizens [29]. The
Nice European Council of December 2000 called for a deeper and wider debate about the
future development of the EU. To this end, a declaration on ‘The Future of the Union’ was
annexed to the Nice Treaty and the debate was formally launched in 2001. Jan Zielonka
argues that ‘although the future EU is usually seen as a new type of Westphalian federal
state with a central government in charge of a given territory with clear-cut borders, an
enlarged EU would more closely resemble a neo-medieval empire with serious practical
and conceptual implications [40].’ He argues that the EU increasingly acts in concentric
circles due to various opt-outs negotiated by individual member states in the areas of
foreign, monetary and social policy. In addition, as a result of the effects of globalization,
the EU lacks a strong and coherent sense of cultural identity, let alone a European demos
or patria [41]. This ambiguity regarding the EU’s own future will not only have clear
implications upon Turkey’s future accession to the EU but will shape the former’s
integration within the EU after a possible accession.4. Future prospects
Turkey’s future in the EU will be determined to a great extent by the answer to the
following question: Will the future of the EU be determined by religious and racial
boundaries, or will it be one that reaches out to embrace the diversity and unity of a much
broader geography? The answer will also indicate if the EU can survive in the light of
future challenges that it will face [6]. The future of Turkey in the EU will be determined
largely by the integration of the new member states. The duration and success of the EU’s
‘digestion period’ [1] will help to determine the time frame for Turkey’s future accession
to the EU. Thus the eventual acceptance of Turkish membership will be a political
decision, and it will depend not only on progress made by Turkey but also on the political
preferences of the EU member governments at the moment of choice [22].
In the short-term, 2004 and 2005 will be crucial years for Turkey–EU relations since
they may affect strongly how EU–Turkey relations will develop, especially after the
European Council Conclusions in December 2004. Although the opening of negotiations
with Turkey constitutes a preliminary step towards the EU membership in the long term, it
will be a crucial decision, both for Turkey and the EU. If the bid is successful, Turkey will
become definitively anchored to the EU. Most likely, this will be followed by positive
political and economic results for Turkey and will lead to a relaxation of the tension
between the EU and Turkey.
In the long-term, the EU’s decision will be more about its own identity and its own
future than the eligibility of Turkey. It will decide whether it will face the challenges of an
emerging new world; whether it is capable of seizing the new economic, historical and
cultural opportunity; whether it can contribute to the embracing of civilizations rather than
‘clash’ of them [31]. It is very important for the EU to send signals to Turkey about its
seriousness. Otherwise, the EU option will lose its credibility in Turkey and strengthen a
feeling of betrayal within Turkish society. The content of the decisions will also affect to
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votes. A postponement of the date for the start of negotiations may increase the tensions
within the Turkish public who already feel somehow alienated from the EU and who bear
the general feeling that “whatever we accomplish, we will never be allowed to step
inside”. The Turkish Prime Minister Erdog˘an has recently stated that “If the EU does not
give the expected go-ahead it will not be difficult for Turkey to channel its huge potential
in another direction”. He also added that “.a negative response from the EU would both
disappoint the Turkish people who have formed its will towards the European values and
damage the philosophical basis of the Union irreversibly” [38].
Unless the EU injects some energy and motivates Turkey by giving a prospective date
for the start of negotations, it seems that, especially after the enlargement of May 2004,
EU–Turkey relations may go down the drain once again, and unfortunately the Turkish
economy is too fragile to carry the extra pressure that this would generate. If the EU
decides to initiate accession negotiations, even if the eventual membership takes a long
time, the decision will lift the pressure, especially on Turkish public opinion; will erase the
current feeling of deprivation, and eventually will ease relations between the two sides.
On the other hand, the image of the EU in the eyes of Turkey is quite controversial since
although some countries adopted a positive attitude, others adopted a negative attitude
towards the decision regarding Turkey. In other words, the EU member states seemed to be
divided over the issue. While Spain, Great Britain, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, Luxembourg
and Greece have earlier declared their support for a date to be given to Turkey for the start
of the accession negotiations, France, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden and Ireland
generally think that a date can be given only after observing the implementation of the
reforms that Turkey has passed through its Parliament [25]. While France and Germany
talk of the year 2005, depending on the Progress Report prepared by the Commission,
Germany, Spain, Italy, Great Britain and Greece think that Turkey should be given a date
by the end of 2004, and according to Belgium this date should be given as soon as possible
[26]. According to the recent declarations, it seems that Austria and France are the leading
countries who oppose Turkey’s membership [20], whereas Belgium and Germany have
been sending positive signals regarding this matter [2].
The decision on whether and when to open accession negotiations on full Turkish
membership in the EU will probably be primarily political, since the measurement of the
progress regarding the Copenhagen Criteria will be very difficult and will remain to the
subjective discretion of the individual member states of the EU. Although the Copenhagen
Criteria are set forth as an important obstacle that will determine the future of Turkey’s
accession, Turkey’s institutional role in the Union’s common foreign and security policies,
its significant military capabilities and its pivotal geographical position will continue to
determine Turkey’s strategic importance for the EU in the post-cold war era, due to the
former’s role in the EU’s possible military operations and strategic concerns. Europe
requires a stable, modernizing and democratic Turkey to keep radical Islam away from
Europe’s borders [23]. If this can be supported by the EU membership, then it will make
the EU membership for Turkey more likely. Turkey’s role in the Middle East-especially
regarding Iraq and Israel, its geostrategic weight in Southeast Europe and the Balkans and
finally its role in the Caspian region as an energy corridor for Europe [17] will help shape
the attitude and policies of the EU in the post-2004 enlargement years. The war on Iraq has
A. Gu¨ney / Futures 37 (2005) 303–316314revealed the importance of Turkey for the stability of the region once again and it is one of
the arguments of the Turks that there are also plausible reasons for the EU to view
Turkey’s membership positively from a security perspective [19].5. Conclusion
In conclusion, it seems quite probable that Turkey will continue its European
orientation in the foreseeable future no matter what kind of response it gets from the EU.
The realization of the ‘yes’ scenerios will most probably depend on the strategic
importance of Turkey for the EU. In any case, the even though the accession negotiations
start in the short-term, their completion and the eventual accession to Turkey to the EU
will probably not take place in 10–20 years. If Turkey becomes a member at the end, it will
definitely be facing a quite different Europe than it is today. Europe, in the meanwhile, will
have at least 27 members with varying support for Turkey’s integration into the EU.
Turkey will be one of the countries, which will have the highest number of seats in the
European Parliament and the European Council due to its high population and will most
likely influence the decision-making process in the EU.
On the other hand, it is also possible that due to the obstacles mentioned earlier, a future
decision for Turkish accession will stay in a limbo. Although the EU may decide to give
a date for the start of the accession negotiations, it will not be able to reach a consensus
among the member states regarding full membership of Turkey to the EU. In this
case, although the official Turkish position will most probably continue its European
orientation, the relations between Turkey and the EU will go through serious crisis due to
eroding confidence of the Turks in the EU. The most important political implication of this
scenerio might be Turkey’s more intraverted and nationalistic stance or a probable rise in
the votes of the Islamic parties with a strong anti-European and anti-Western rhetoric and
practice. The economic implications of such a scenerio may suggest a serious economic
crisis due to the outflow of foreign capital from Turkey on whose economy is highly
dependent. This will lead to further isolation of Turkey and a subsequent social and
economic instability in the country.
No matter which scenerio may come true, it is important to note that the 45-year old
Turkey–EU relations have come to an important turning point. The future course of events
will be determined by the developments that will take place within the EU; by the degree
to which Turkey will be able to meet the EU’s demands; and by the international context
that will frame the future of Turkey in the EU.References
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